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Foreign Investment in the United States
TODD WEILER, NANCY L. PERKINS, FRAK J. SCHUCHAT, MELISSA

R.

KAUFMAN,

RIcHARD L. GOLDMAN, AND HENRY M. BURWELL*

I. NAFTA Investor-State Dispute Settlement Gains Steam
The year 2000 witnessed an increase in the frequency and importance of North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) investor-state claims involving U.S. investors in Canada
and Mexico, and Canadian claims against the United States. During 2000, two NAFTA
tribunals rendered final merits awards in favor of claims made by U.S. investors, and a
significant number of procedural orders and jurisdictional awards were also made by various
tribunals during 2000. One tribunal even heard the first application by non-parties to intervene in investor-state proceedings.'
As a result of the many awards and procedural orders that have emanated from these
independent, ad hoc tribunals, many NAFTA provisions have received their first interpretation and a number of fundamental procedural issues have been addressed. This short
article reviews the most notable procedural issues that arose before NAFTA tribunals in
2000, and then outlines what those tribunals have said about two of the substantive provisions of the NAFTA.
A.

TRIBUNAL COMPOSITION

In its November 2000 merits award, the Tribunal in S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada2 (the Myers
Tribunal) noted that its composition changed as a result of a challenge by the investor
*Todd Weiler advises governments, investors, and their counsel on NAFTA investor-state arbitration matters
and on international trade law and policy. Nancy L. Perkins is a special counsel with Arnold & Porter in Washington, D.C.; her practice focuses on international trade and investment; she also represented Argentina in the
arbitration discussed in Part 11.FrankJ. Schuchat, partner, and Melissa R. Kaufman, associate, are with Ireland,
Stapleton, Pryor & Pascoe, P.C., in Denver, Colorado, practicing international law, import and export law, technology transfers, and corporate law. Richard L. Goldman is a partner with Goldman & Gladstone in NewYork,
concentrating on international tax and trusts and estates law; he is a past president of the International Fiscal
Association (USA Branch). Henry M. Burwell is a partner with Nelson, Mullins, Riley, & Scarborough in Greenville, South Carolina, practicing international business and trade, immigration, and corporate law.
1. Copies of all NAFTA awards and pleadings that have been made public can be found at: http://
www.naftaclaims.com, including all of the awards and orders discussed in this article.
2. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2000).
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to Canada's choice of arbitrator, the Honorable Bob Rae. The investor challenged Mr.
Rae's appointment when it learned that Mr. Rae was planning to engage in lobbying activities involving the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, which
is responsible for performing the roles shared by the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) and the Department of State in the United States. The Secretary General of the
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), who is designated
under the NAFTA as the Appointing Authority for all arbitrations, was asked to determine
whether it would be appropriate for a NAFTA arbitrator to be lobbying one of the NAFTA
parties while judging a dispute involving that party. The Secretary General's Office communicated its preliminary impression of the challenge to the parties and Mr. Rae resigned
his position as arbitrator soon thereafter.
B.

THE WAIVER AND CONSENT REQUIREMENT

While Mexico suffered its first major NAFTA investor-state loss in 2000, it also experienced its second win. This victory came through a successful motion for dismissal of a
claim by Waste Management, Inc., concerning the alleged expropriation of its investment
in Mexico.'
NAFTA Article 1121 provides that an investor may submit a claim only if it submits
notice of its consent to arbitration under the NAFTA and a waiver of the right to pursue
any proceedings with respect to the measure at issue in its claim.4 Notices of waiver and
consent must be filed on behalf of both the investor and its investment (if that investment
takes the form of a legal person in the host country). Article 1121 does include a major
exception, however, that permits an investor to continue "proceedings for injunctive, declaratory or other extraordinary relief, not involving the payment of damages" before an
administrative tribunal or court found in the country responsible for the measure.'
Waste Management filed a waiver that a majority of the Tribunal concluded only foreclosed on Waste Management's ability to seek damages locally for claims founded upon
breaches of international law. The majority concluded, however, that the purpose of the
waiver was to prevent concurrent domestic and international proceedings that might result
in double recovery for the same "measure" (i.e., government conduct that would constitute
a measure under the NAFTA). As Waste Management had continued to seek damages for
alleged breaches of concession and line-of-credit agreements that were bound up in the
measure, the majority determined that its waiver (which Waste Management consistently
admitted did not preclude its carrying on with the domestic proceedings) was insufficient
for the purposes of NAFTA Article 1121, and that therefore it lacked jurisdiction to hear
the claim.
The lesson of this case appears to be that investors must choose carefully between seeking
damages either under the NAFTA or domestically, regardless of whether the government
action complained of (i.e., "the measure") would constitute a breach of a different kind of
law, depending upon the forum chosen. As the majority indicated in its award, the same

3.
4.
4919
5.

See Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ARB(AF)/98/2 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2000).
See North American Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 12, 1992, U.S.-Mexico-Canada, art. 1101, 31 U.S.T.
[hereinafter NAFTA.
See id. art. 1121.
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kind of local government conduct that might be found to constitute a breach of domestic
contract law may also constitute failure to accord fair and equitable treatment to an investment under NAFTA Article 1105.6 But the investor must choose one forum or the
other or risk having the choice made for it by either the domestic or the international
tribunal from which it has sought damages.
One might wonder what the result would have been if an unequivocal waiver had been
submitted, rather than a conditional one. It is submitted that the NAFTA Tribunal's response to evidence of noncompliance of an unconditional waiver would be to inform the
NAFTA party in question to submit the investor's waiver in defense to the local proceedings
and to continue on with its hearing. Had the majority not concluded that Waste Management's conditional waiver was defective (as evidenced in both its conduct and argumentation), the arbitration most likely should have continued.'
C.

ARTICLE i ioI

-How

MUST A

MEASURE

RELATE TO INVESTORS AND THEIR

INVESTMENTS?

NAFTA Article 1101 provides that the obligations contained within Chapter 11 only
apply to measures adopted or maintained by a NAFTA party "relating to" the investors of
another NAFTA party, and to their investments in that NAFTA party's territory.' In 1998,
9
Canada argued before the tribunal in Ethyl Corporation v. Canada (Ethyl), that it had no
jurisdiction to hear the claim because it concerned a measure relating to trade in goods
and, thus, could not also be "related" to the investor or its investment. The Ethyl Tribunal
did not directly address this argument in its award and the claim was subsequently settled.
In 2000, similar arguments were made (unsuccessfully) by NAFTA governments in many
other arbitrations, including the Tribunal hearing Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada (Pope &
Talbot).' ° The Pope & Talbot Tribunal appears to have been the first, however, to render a
decision directly on point.
The Pope & Talbot Tribunal issued an award in January 2000, stating that although a
measure may be primarily designed to affect trade in goods, it could nonetheless have an
impact upon investors and their investments such that it could be said to "relate to" those
investments. This award, which appears to implicitly follow the lead of the WTO Appellate

6. See Monsieur Keba Mbaye, Societe Quest Afriaine de Betons Industriels contre La Republique du Senegal,

ICSID REviEw, Vol. 6, No.1, Spring 1991, at 235. This view was rejected by the dissenting member of the
Tribunal, who recalled the obiter dicta of the Azinian Tribunal that a mere breach of contract under local law
cannot constitute a breach of international law. While this statement appears eminently reasonable, it does not
preclude the possibility that what might constitute a breach of domestic law might also constitute a breach of
international law. While the former cannot be pleaded as evidence of the latter, the same evidence used to
establish one kind of breach might very well be used to also establish the other.
7. See Waste Management (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2000). Of course, the Waste Management Tribunal appears
to have neglected that, by filing its claim, Waste Management constructively consented to the arbitration and
waived all of its rights to proceed domestically as a matter of international arbitral law. Nonetheless, it would
appear from a notice posted on the ICSID website that Waste Management may have refilled its NAFTAclaim
(presumably with an amended waiver) by the end of 2000.
8. See NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1101. Article 1101 also provides that Chapter 11 applies to all investments
in a NAFTA party's territory-with respect to the chapter's prohibition on performance requirements (Article
1106) and its environmental provision (Article 1114).
9. Ethyl Corp. v. Canada (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 1998).
10. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2000).
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Body in cases such as Canada-Periodicalsand EC-Bananas,I I clarifies that measures can have
multiple impacts upon different types of trade and investment-thereby attracting the simultaneous coverage of various chapters of the NAFTA. This award appears to have confirmed that whenever a "trade" measure impacts negatively upon a NAFTA investment, so
long as that impact can be couched in the terms of a breach of NAFTA Chapter 11, a
remedy may be available to the investor that requires the filing of a Section 301 action to
convince the USTR to launch a state-to-state dispute settlement proceeding under the
appropriate trade treaty.
D.

CLAIMS FOR CONSEQUENTIAL LOSSEs BY AN INVESTOR

The Pope & Talbot Tribunal was presented with another jurisdictional motion from Canada that it disposed of early in 2000.12 The investor's statement of claim included a claim
for losses it had incurred through the consequential damages suffered by its investment in
a pulp and paper company called Harmac Pacific Corp. This was not the investment in
Canada that was the primary focus of Pope & Talbot's claim-but its subsidiary that operated three softwood lumber mills in the interior of British Columbia. Pope & Talbot's
claim was that its softwood lumber investment was directly affected by the measure. Pope
& Talbot's pulp and paper investment only experienced indirect harm as a result of the
secondary impact of Canada's measure on the pulp and paper sector. The measure was an
export restraint mechanism that hindered the export of softwood lumber from Canada and
thus changed the nature and quantity of wood fiber available for use in the pulp and paper
sector.
Canada argued that the investor could not make a claim for losses it incurred through
its pulp and paper investment unless (1) a waiver for the pulp and paper investment was
filed with the statement of claim and (2) the statement of claim contained an allegation that
the investment was directly affected by a breach of NAFTA Chapter 11 (not consequentially
affected). Since Pope & Talbot had only filed waivers on behalf of itself and its softwood
lumber investment, and since its statement of claim did not allege that the measure directly
impacted upon its pulp and paper investment in a manner that breached the NAFTA,
Canada argued that this part of the claim had to be dismissed. Moreover, because three
years had elapsed since the date upon which the loss had occurred, under NAFFA Article
1116(2), time has essentially "run out" on the investor to amend its claim.

Article 1116(1) permits an investor to make a claim for any losses it has incurred "by
reason of, or arising out of" a breach of the NAFTA.I3 The Pope & Talbot Tribunal deter-

mined that Canada had failed to prove that three years had definitely elapsed since the
secondary loss to its pulp and paper investment had taken place. It further found that an
investor was entitled under Article 1116(1) to make a claim for all losses it suffered as a
result of an alleged breach, including consequential ones, and it found that the waiver

requirement contained within Article 112114 (and discussed above) was not an essential
precondition for the validity of a claim. Recalling the jurisdictional award of the Ethyl
11. See European Communities-Regimefor the Importation, Sale and Distribution ofBananas, WT/DS/27/AB/
R (WTO Appellate Body: 9 September 1997); Canada-CertainMeasuresAffecting Periodicals,WT/DS3 I/AB/
R (WTO Appellate Body: 30 June 1997).
12. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2000).
13. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1116.
14. See id. art. 1121.
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Tribunal, the Pope & Talbot Tribunal stated that the very act of filing a statement of claim
under the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules
constituted a constructive waiver and consent to arbitration on behalf of Pope & Talbot and
its investments. The NAFTAArticle 1121 waiver only benefited the investor, because it permitted Pope & Talbot to file a limited waiver that permitted it to pursue proceedings other
than those for damages. Accordingly, as any failure to file a formal waiver notice could in no
way have prejudiced Canada, Pope & Talbot's claim was allowed to proceed in its entirety.
E.

THE PROPER SCOPE FOR ARGUMENTS ON JURISDICTION

While admittedly less glamorous, and perhaps more arcane than merits awards, awards
dealing with the NAFTA parties' motions to dismiss are generating a significant body of
arbitration law. This body of law may well guide the development of NAFTA arbitration
for years to come, and the aforementioned decisions by the Pope & Talbot Tribunal are
excellent examples of decisions that can guide NAIFTA lawyers in framing their claims.
One reason for the development of this body of law is the consistent practice of NAFTA
parties of bringing motions for dismissal in almost every claim filed, even though only one
has thus far been successful. One reason for this less-than-stellar record may be that the
NAFTA parties have brought motions that did not have a very high chance of success. To
establish the jurisdiction of a tribunal to hear a claim under the NAFTA, a NAFTA investor
must merely make a claim that the measure of a NAFTA party breached one of the obligations mentioned in NAFTA Article 1116 or 1117, in relation to it or its investment in
that NAFTA party's territory and that as a result of this breach it has suffered a loss. At
that point, a tribunal is fully empowered under the NAFTA to proceed. Nonetheless, motions to dismiss have been brought, not only over alleged procedural defects, but also over
"merits" defenses that are not properly the subject of a jurisdictional hearing.
For example, in 2000, the United States brought a five-part motion to dismiss the claims
of Canadian investors Raymond Loewen and The Loewen Group, Inc., regarding the conduct of a Mississippi tort case that resulted in a $500,000,000 judgment against their investment."5 In January 2001, the Tribunal dismissed the motion, on every ground. Three
of the grounds alleged by the United States were dismissed because the Tribunal determined
that they were more appropriately addressed at a merits hearing. A fourth was dismissed
summarily, because it was "not pressed" strongly at the hearing. The Tribunal appears to
have only regarded one ground of the motion of belonging in a jurisdictional phase-which
was whether the judgment of a state court constituted a "measure" under the NAFTA. It
concluded that the judgment was indeed a "measure" under the definition contained within
NAFTA Article 201.
This final aspect of the Loewen award confirms that NAFTA Tribunals are apparently
prepared to regard most forms of state action or inaction (regardless of the branch of state,
or-as a result of Article 105-the level of government, involved) as constituting a measure
for the purposes of a Chapter 11 claim. In yet another interim award made by the Pope &
Talbot Tribunal in 2000, it was also established that a claim would remain valid even if the
regulatory regime at issue were modified by new regulations that did not even exist at the
time the claim was made. 16 The measure in that case was amended almost two years after

15. See The Loewen Group, Inc. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (ICSID Arb. Trib. 2001).
16. SeePope & Talbot, Inc. (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2000).
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the claim was brought, with the effect of making it even more difficult for the investment
to export its product to the United States. The Tribunal found that while the amendment
represented a significant change to the measure, it nonetheless resulted in the same kind
of harm alleged by Pope & Talbot and was therefore captured by its original claim that an
export restriction was harming its business in Canada. The Tribunal's focus appears to have
been on whether the statement of claim identified a course of state conduct resulting in
some kind of loss or harm, rather than on the technicalities of whether the legislative or
regulatory means through which the measure was imposed remained the same throughout
the course of the arbitration.
F. CONFIDENTIALITY AND AMIcus SUBMISSIONS

One area in which NAFTA investor-state practice has not resulted in a consistent pattern
is with respect to the treatment of confidentiality. It appears that in NAFTA arbitrations
involving the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, either the parties have consented to or their
tribunals have ordered rules on confidentiality that are apparently less restrictive than arbitration proceedings conducted under the UNCITRAL rules. 7
Both in the Loewen arbitration and in the arbitration between Methanex Corporationv.
United States (Methanex),8 it appears that the parties are essentially permitted to release
their own written arguments at their discretion. The parties in Loewen appear to have gone
so far as to agree on the release of all written submissions, and even the minutes of hearings,
upon completion of their arbitration. Article 44(2) of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules
provides that the minutes of hearings are to remain confidential unless the parties to the
arbitration agree otherwise. 19 In contrast, Article 25(4) of the UNCITAL rules provides

that all hearings are to be conducted in camera, and to this effect NAFTA Tribunals operating under the UNCITRAL rules in 2000 have ordered the parties before them not to
unilaterally release the contents of either oral or written communication concerning their
2°
arbitrations, and have strictly enforced these prohibitions.
The year 2000 also brought the issue of confidentiality into a different focus, with the
first application by nonparties for standing to participate in a NAFTA arbitration. The
application was made by two environmental interest groups to gain access to the Methanex

arbitration. In January 2001, the Methanex Tribunal issued an award stating that while it
had the authority under the UNCITRAL rules to accept unsolicited written submissions
by interested nonparties (i.e., amicus curiae), it did not have the authority to permit access
to the hearings or written pleadings without the consent of the parties to the arbitration.
It also noted that if it were to accept amicus submissions, it would only do so on the
condition that they were deemed necessary for the Tribunal to make a better decision and
would not otherwise violate the rules of the NAFTA or the equality of the parties to the
arbitration. Accordingly, not unlike the practice that has developed within the World Trade
Organization (WTO) context,2 while arbitrators have asserted the power to accept amicus
17. See NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1120. Under NAFTA Article 1120, the investor makes the choice of
arbitral rules under which the arbitration will proceed.
18. Methanex Corporation v. United States (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2000).
19. See Additional Facility Rules, ICSID, art. 44, para. 2.
20. See Arbitration ProceedingsRules, UNCITRAL, art. 25.
21. SeeUnited States-Imposition of CountervailingDutieson Steel Products,WT/DS 13 8/AB/R (WTO Appellate Body: 10 May 2000) at 13; United States-Import Prohibitionon Shrimp,WT/DS58/AB/R (WTO Appellate
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submissions, they have reserved using that right to the very limited circumstances in which
they determine that amicus submissions would be appropriate and helpful to them in completing their task.
G. No

"CROWN PRIVILEGE" IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Another interesting award, which attracted little North American press coverage in 2000,
was the decision of the Pope & Talbot Tribunal concerning Canada's refusal to produce
22
documents under something it referred to as "crown privilege." Canada had made similar
prevented from disclowere
that
it
claimed
of
documents
wide
array
a
refusals to produce
23
sure under its domestic law in recent WTO proceedings. Both the panel and the WTO
Appellate Body confirmed that while Canada could not be compelled to produce the documents it had withheld, an adverse inference could be drawn about the contents of those
documents based upon Canada's refusal.
After indicating that Canada's articulation of its obligation (i.e., ability) to withhold cabinet documents under its own access to information law might be more narrow than had
been argued,24 the Pope & Talbot Tribunal came to essentially the same conclusion as did
the WTO tribunals. The Tribunal indicated that for Canada to even argue for the applicability of the "state secrets" doctrine in international law (which is widely regarded as
justifying only the refusal to disclose documents of vital interest to the security of the state),
Canada would have to produce more information, and specific argumentation about the
documents it planned to withhold, rather than a blanket assertion over all of the documents
25

it withheld.

This award clarifies that while NAFTA parties maintain the right to withhold

whatever documents they consider appropriate, their decision to do so is made at the peril
of a Tribunal determining that the NAFTA party may have something to hide.
H.

INTERPRETATION OF

NAFTA

ARTICLE

1105

Two awards were made in 2000 that provided a first look at the interpretation of NAFTA
Article 1105. This provision promises to rise in importance over the coming years, given
the meanings that appear to be readily discernable from the plain meaning of its text. Article
1105(1) provides that: "Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party
treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and
26
full protection and security."
Every tribunal that had occasion to comment upon the proper approach to interpretation
of the NAFTA text in 2000 found that the NAFTA investment provisions must be accorded
a broad and remedial reading to ensure that the liberalizing goals of the NAFTA are re-

Body: 12 October 1998); European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos ContainingProducts,
W'T/DS135/9 (WTO Appellate Body: Nov. 8, 2000).
22. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2000).
23. See Canada-MeasuresAffecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, VIT/DS70/AB/R (WTO Panel: 14 April
1999) at 166; Canada-MeasuresAffecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, VT/DS70/AB/R (WTO Appellate
Body: 2 August 1999) at 47.
24. The Canadian appointee to the Pope & Talbot Tribunal was a retired judge of the superior court in
Quebec, who would not be unfamiliar with Canadian access to information legislation.
25. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2000).
26. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1105.
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alized. Accordingly, while NAFTA parties have argued that NAFTA Article 1105 has little
more than a historical significance (establishing a minimalstandard of treatment that would
encompass little more than protection against the investor being beaten or jailed without
trial), NAFTA Tribunals have adopted a broader interpretation that would appear to be
correct on the face of Article 1105.
NAFTA Article 1105 provides that the investments of NAFTA investors must be treated
in accordance with international law.27 "International law" is not defined in the NAFTA,
although the traditional sources of international law are well known: treaty, custom, principles followed by the decisions of other international tribunals, and the writing of renowned "publicists." A majority of the Myers Tribunal appear to have sensibly refined this
list of international law sources to suggest that the "international law" mentioned in Article
1105 refers primarily to international economic law, including treaty obligations, that are
related to (or perhaps oriented to) the protection or promotion of the rights or economic
interests of investors.
After having already found that a strong discriminatory animus existed against S.D. Myers
and its investment in Canada "at all levels" of Canadian federal government decision making
(which constituted a breach of NAFTA Article 1102-national treatment), 8 a majority of
the Myers Tribunal took the logical step of concluding that such behavior also constituted
a breach of Article 1105.29 Accordingly, the Tribunal found it unnecessary to address in
further detail how or whether the various individual incidents involved in the case could
also be characterized as a failure to act in accordance with the principles of international
economic law, including fair and equitable treatment.
The Tribunal in Metaklad Corporationv. Mexico (Metalclad)10 had the opportunity to explore the scope of the international law principle of "fair and equitable treatment" in its
award, delivered at the end of the summer of 2000. In that case, a U.S. investor in Mexico
had gone about applying for, and received, all the necessary federal and state permits to
build a waste treatment facility in the Mexican state of San Luis Potosi. It built its facility
and, just as it came time to open for business, the investment was hit with a flurry of state
and municipal government actions that had the effect of permanently closing the facility
before it could ever open.
In analyzing the consistency of these various governmental actions with the "fair and
equitable" treatment standard, the MetacladTribunal made the kind of findings that would
not seem unfamiliar to a domestic administrative law practitioner. It would accordingly
appear that the same type of conduct that constitutes a breach of fundamental fairness
domestically may also fall below the international standards of treatment that have been
prescribed under NAFTA Article 1105. From the Metalclad award, that list of international
standards would appear to include
* The right to a fair hearing;"
* Protection against decisions made with a lack of sufficient evidence on the record;"

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See id.
See id. art. 1102.
See S.D. Myers, Inc. (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2000).
Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2000).
Seeid. paras. 51,91.
See id. para. 52.
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33

"The right to be compensated for a breach of legitimate expectations;

(i.e., activities by officials
* Protection from ultra vires actions by government officials
3
acting beyond the scope of their regulatory authority); 4
* Protection against decisions made on the basis of irrelevant considerations (i.e., factors
35
not contemplated in the legislative or regulatory framework); and
36
* Compensation for actions that fall below a minimum standard for transparency.
While it is understandable that government officials in the three NAIFTA parties might
not be pleased to hear that the NAFTA provides a special remedy to NAFTA investors to
have an international tribunal review their conduct, businesses and their lawyers should be
thrilled to learn that an effective "new" remedy exists through which to protect their vital
interests. That remedy is compensation, which can be sought at the same time that the
investor seeks a writ of certiorari,or some other form of special relief from a domestic court.
I.

INTERPRETATION OF

NAFTA ARTICLE

I 110

When NAFTA investor-state arbitration first gained attention a few years ago, it appeared that NAFTA Article 1110 was the "effective new remedy" to be used by NAFTA
investors to protect their vital interests. 7 While it still remains a powerful obligation, three
tribunals in the year 2000 rendered awards that have clarified exactly when application of
NAFTA Article 1110 may be appropriate.
In late 1999, trade and investment lawyers learned from the Tribunal in Azinian v.
Mexico3" that not every "disappointment" experienced by an investor as a result of the action
or inaction of a NAFTA party would result in an obligation to pay compensation under
NAFTA Article 1110. More specifically, it appeared from this fact-intensive decision that
under NAFTA Article 1110, a government was more than entitled to abrogate a contract
with an investor or its investment if it could be established that to do so would be perfectly
in accordance with the domestic law of contract and minimum international standards. In
2000, from a majority of the Waste Management Tribunal, we also learned that if the abrogation of such a contract cannot be justified under minimum international standards, the
NAFTA may well provide an alternative remedy to investors who would prefer to make
their case before an international tribunal under NAFTA Articles 1105 and 1110, rather
than a domestic court using local contract law.39
We learned from the Myers Tribunal that even if a measure has all of the characteristics
of an expropriation under NAFTA Article 1110, but is not permanent (or at least of long-40
term effect), compensation will not be owed under the specific terms of Article 1110(2).
We also learned from the Pope & Talbot Tribunal that unless the impact of a measure is
33. See id. para. 80.
34. See id. paras. 86, 95.
35. Seeid. para. 92.
36. See id. para. 88.
37. See NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1110.
38. Azinian v. United Mexican States, Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2, Nov. 1, 1999.
39. See Waste Management, Inc. (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2000).
40. See NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1110. The essential effect of NAFTA Article 1110(2) is to consider the
investment "sold" to the NAFTA party as of the date that the expropriation was imposed, including compensation for future profits and any consequential losses. There are no specific provisions to guide the valuation
of damages under the other NAFTA provisions and recourse must accordingly be had to the jurisprudence of
damages under international law.
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one of "substantial interference" with an investment, Article 1110 will not be breached.41
It is unclear from the facts of that case exactly what the standard of "substantial interference"
should be, but it appears that if an investment can remain profitable, despite suffering a 10
to 20 percent hit to its capacity to conduct its business, 42 a tribunal may be unwilling to
4
find that compensation is owed under NAFTA Article 1110. 1
Another interesting conclusion that can be drawn from the awards of both the Pope &
Talbot Tribunal and the Myers Tribunal, which both found that NAFTA Article 1110 had
not been breached, is that the "investment" that needs to be established to meet the threshold for obtaining jurisdiction to bring a claim under the NAFTA is not necessarily the
"investment" to be considered under NAFTA Article 1110. In other words, an investor
apparently does not need to prove that its subsidiary in the territory of another NAFTA
party has actually been taken over or shut down to seek compensation under Article I 110.
It need only prove that some form of economic interest that can be identified as its "investment" under NAFTA Article 1139 has suffered from substantial interference as a result
of the imposition of some government measure. For example, the Pope & Talbot Tribunal
determined that Pope & Talbot did not have to prove that Canada owned or controlled its
Canadian subsidiary to prove expropriation. 44 The subsidiary's access to the U.S. market
was an "investment" that was protected from substantial interference under NAFTAArticle
to S.D. Myers's
1110. The Myers Tribunal made a very similar conclusion with respect
45
access to the Canadian market for its PCB waste remediation business.
What remains of particular concern to some observers, however, despite the obvious
limitations already outlined above, was the Pope & Talbot Tribunal's interpretation of the
plain meaning of the terms of Article 1110 regarding "regulatory takings." The Tribunal
held that the NAFTA parties may owe compensation to affected foreign investments for
"non-discriminatory measures of general application," even if they do not otherwise fall
below minimum international standards.- It remains to be seen whether this conclusion
can be used by a polluting business to seek compensation for an otherwise legitimate or
justifiable regulatory taking. It would appear that the open-ended compensation criteria
outlined in Article 1110(2) could be used to prevent the "polluter pays" principle from ever
being converted into a "pay the polluter" principle under the NAFTA, and thus effectively
resolve this potential problem.41
The only Tribunal to have found in favor of an investor under Article 1110 is theMetakad
Tribunal, whose September 2000 award was far more focused on the application of

41. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2000).
42. See id. This evaluation is in no way related to the specific damages incurred by Pope & Talbot, Inc., or
its investment. Rather, it is based on publicly available Canadian government documents that suggest that most
softwood lumber businesses suffered more than a 15 percent loss in their ability to export to the United States
as a result of the imposition of its export-control measure.
43. See id. Based on the conclusion of the Pope & Talbot Tribunal, one wonders whether a less profitable
enterprise (or a small business) that is more seriously injured by same measure that only irritates a larger
competitor will actually be entitled to a compensation under NAFTA Article 1110 that would not be owed to
the larger, more profitable players in the same market.
44. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1139.
45. See S.D. Myers, Inc. (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2000).
46. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2000).
47. NAFTA Article 1110(2) provides that "Valuation criteria shall include going concern value, asset value
including declared tax value of tangible property, and otber criteria,as appropriate,to determine fair market
value" (emphasis added). NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1110.
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NAFFA Article 1105 than on Article 1110. Moreover, the Metalclad award says little about
the aforementioned controversy because its Article 1105 analysis indicates that since the
measures involved fell below minimum standards of fairness and equity in international law,
4
they constituted an unjustifiable or illegal taking under Article 1110 anyway. It remains
to be seen whether a case exists, or that a NAFTA Tribunal will ever find, that an otherwise
valid measure will require compensation under NAFTA Article 1110-or whether under
the circumstances of such a case, compensation would not actually be justified for the taking
of a NAFTA investment.
J. CONCLUSION

The year 2000 was a good year for those who study NAFTA investor-state arbitration, and
for NAFTA investors. The trickle of claims that began late in the last decade is now
resulting in a slow but steady stream of substantive and procedural case law that promises
to contribute substantially to international economic law in general, and to the elimination
of unnecessary barriers to the growth of a North American free market in particular.
II. ICSID Decision on Federal Responsibility to Foreign
Investors for Provincial Government Conduct
In a decision with significant implications for foreign investors in the United States and
other countries with similar constitutional structures, a tribunal of the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) determined that a federal government is
not necessarily responsible for acts of its constituent subdivisions that may transgress the
rights of foreign investors under a national bilateral investment treaty. The decision, issued
49
on November 21, 2000, in Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentina, marks an
important development in clarifying the circumstances in which foreign investors may invoke a federal government's international commitments as a basis for relief from acts that
the federal government itself did not take, direct, or control.
The ICSID case arose from a dispute associated with a concession contract that a French
company, Compagnie G~nrale des Eaux, and its Argentine affiliate, Compafifa de Aguas

del Aconquija, S.A. (collectively Claimants), entered into with Tucumin, a province of
Argentina. The central government of Argentina (Republic) was not a party to the concession contract or to the negotiations that produced it, nor did the Republic agree to guarantee any investments by the Claimants in connection with the contract. The Republic's
involvement in the case was prompted by requests from the Claimants, who, when disagreements erupted between them and Tucumdn several years after the contract was signed,
sought the Republic's help in attempting to renegotiate the contract terms. Despite the
provision of such assistance by the Republic, the renegotiations ultimately failed.
The Claimants then sought relief for what they characterized as an expropriation of their
investments under the concession contract. They did not deny that their claims arose out
of the concession contract but, rather than pleading breach of contract, they styled their
pleadings as a case against the Republic under Argentina's bilateral investment treaty with
the Government of France (the BIT). Under the BIT, foreign investors of either party's
48. See Metaklad Corp. (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2000).
49. Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3 (ICSID Arb. Trib.
2000).
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nationality may, subject to certain conditions, sue the other party in ICSID for failure to
provide such "fair and equitable" treatment or protection against expropriation of their
investments.
When the Claimants presented their claims to ICSID, Argentina immediately protested
on jurisdictional grounds. Under the express terms of the concession contract between the
Claimants and Tucumfn, disputes over the contract-either its interpretation or application-were to be submitted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Tucumin. In addition, when Argentina consented to ICSID jurisdiction over disputes with foreign investors
generally, it did not extend such consent to cases brought directly against any of the Argentine provinces. Both for these legal reasons and because, as the Republic put it, the
Republic was "a stranger" to the prolonged concession contract dispute between the Claimants and Tucumin, ICSID arguably lacked jurisdiction over the case.
The Claimants, however, countered that they were not suing Tucumin under the concession contract; rather, they were suing the Republic for breach of its obligations under the
BIT According to the Claimants, the Republic itself bore responsibility for the alleged
wrongs of Tucum~n, both by virtue of the "attribution" to the Republic of those wrongs
and because the Republic had failed to prevent them. The Republic protested that it could
not, under its own federal Constitution, legally have taken any of the various actions against
Tucumin that the Claimants alleged were due, but the Claimants asserted that such a
domestic legal bar was no excuse for the violation of international law they alleged.
After considering these competing arguments, the Tribunal found:
Under international law, and for purposes of jurisdiction of this Tribunal, it is well established
that actions of a political subdivision of federal state, such as the Province of Tucumln in the
federal state of the Argentine Republic, are attributable to the central government. It is equally
clear that the internal constitutional structure of a country can not alter these obligations."'
Based on this finding and because the Claimants alleged certain wrongful acts and omissions
of the Republic itself, not relying on any principle of attribution, the Tribunal found that
neither the forum selection clause of the concession contract nor the fact that Argentina
had not consented to ICSID jurisdiction over claims against the Argentine provinces barred
ICSID jurisdiction in the case.
Having found the existence of an international law principle of "attribution" of acts of
subfederal entities to federal central governments for jurisdictional purposes, the Tribunal
might have been expected then to treat all the claims in the case as involving alleged wrongdoing by the Republic, irrespective of the fact that the vast majority of wrongful acts asserted
were actions of Tucumn. But the Tribunal did not take such a simplistic approach. It set
forth the parties' respective key legal positions and how it would deal with those positions:
Claimants contend ... that every action of the Province of Tucumfin, taken in the exercise of
sovereign power and not as a party to a contract, is directly attributed to the Argentine
Republic....

Claimants argue that the Argentine Republic is subject to a strict liability standard under the
BIT and that any action of the Province that violates the BIT creates liability on the part of
Respondent....

50. Id.
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The Argentine Republic maintains that the standard of its liability is limited to what the parties
and the Tribunal have sometimes termed "due diligence" but which may be more appropriately
termed "good offices," i.e., a duty to undertake a good faith effort through actions of its federal
officials to help resolve the controversy between the Province and Claimants.
Claimants respond that this lesser standard of obligation . . .applies only if the actions of
private parties are involved -not actions of a political subdivision such as a Province. In any
event, Claimants contend that the Argentine Republic violated its obligation under the BIT
and applicable international law even under this lesser standard because the Argentine Republic
"failed ...to take reasonable measures to solve the conflict and protect or redress damage to
Claimants." 5
The Tribunal reasoned that despite having found, for jurisdictional purposes, the existence of an international law principle of "attribution," as discussed above, in order to make
a decision on the merits, it did not have to determine the validity of the Claimants' "strict
liability" attribution theory. The Tribunal stated:
To resolve these issues in this case, the Tribunal need not determine generally whether bilateral
investment treaties with provisions forbidding expropriation in the absence of full compensation and requiring fair and equitable treatment under international law impose a strict liability
standard on a central government for actions of a political subdivision. Instead, the Tribunal
resolves this case on the basis of the specific allegations on which the Claimants base their
claims and their legal significance in light of the terms of the Concession Contract and the
BIT.2
The Tribunal then proceeded to analyze each of the various ways in which the Claimants
asserted the Republic was either derivatively responsible for Tucumrn's actions or failed,
either by insufficient action or inaction, "to have caused Tucumin (i) to refrain from exercising governmental powers that abrogated the rights of Claimants, or (ii) to comply with
the terms of the Concession Contract."" With respect to the Republic's alleged derivative
liability, the Tribunal observed that all of the acts of Tucumin that the Claimants relied on
to show such liability were closely linked to the performance or non-performance of the
concession contract, and thus specifically arose from disputes between the Claimants and
Tucumn under the contract. The Tribunal found that "[b]ecause of the crucial connection
...between the terms of the Concession Contract and th[e] alleged violations of the BIT,"
the Republic could not be held liable "unless and until the Claimants asserted their rights
in proceedings before the courts of Tucuman-as required by the forum selection clause
in the concession contract-and were denied their rights in those courts, either procedurally
or substantively."54 This was imperative, the Tribunal explained, because in order to make
determinations as to whether the relevant acts of Tucumin had been taken as an exercise
of Tucumn's sovereign authority or rather as a party to the contract would require "detailed
interpretation and application" of the concession contract, which was "a task left by the
parties to the contract to the exclusive jurisdiction of the administrative courts of Tucumin."" The Claimants' failure to seek remedies in those courts, therefore, precluded any

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ground for an ICSID decision that Argentina was liable under the principle of "attribution"
asserted by the Claimants.
With respect to the Claimants' separate claims that the Republic was liable under the
BIT for failing to prevent or otherwise interfere with Tucumn's allegedly wrongful actions,
the Tribunal found the facts on record to be decisive. The record evidence, the Tribunal
observed, plainly contradicted Claimants' assertions that, inter alia, (1) Argentina's officials
had ever failed to take any specific action requested by the Claimants; (2) Tucumin had so
violated the contract as to require Argentina to seek a legal remedy against Tucumin; or
(3) Argentina had failed to respond to the situation in Tucumin or the Claimant's requests
in accordance with Argentina's obligations under the contract. Indeed, the Tribunal found
"ample evidence in the record that federal officials of the Argentine Republic played a
constructive role" in the attempts by the Claimants and Tucumin to resolve their disagreements. Thus, the Tribunal held, "the record of these proceedings does not provide a basis
for holding that the Argentine Republic failed to respond to the situation in Tucumin and
the requests of the Claimants in accordance with the obligations of the Argentine govern56
ment under the BIT.
The Tribunal's decision, while carefully limited to the facts of the case, nevertheless does
provide important clarification of international law. Most significantly, while not resolving
whether a federal government may in some circumstances be subject to "strict liability" for
acts of constituent subdivision governments, the decision confirms that, under current international law, there is no rule that acts of a political subdivision allegedly breaching rights
of foreign investors under a BIT may automatically be "attributed" to the subdivision's
central government for purposes of determining liability under the BIT.
Ill. Acquisitions of Telecommunications Companies
The year 2000 saw a noteworthy intervention by the Committee on Foreign Investment
in the United States (CFIUS) in connection with a multibillion-dollarJapanese acquisition
of the world's largest operator of websites for businesses and a provider of comprehensive
Internet services, including high-speed access and a national Internet backbone infrastructure.
Pursuant to the Exon-Florio Amendment to the Defense Production Act of 1950,"
CFIUS is charged with investigating foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies to determine
whether the foreign interest exercising control over a U.S.-acquired entity "might take
action that threatens to impair the national security."" s The president may block or restrict
a transaction if the president finds "credible evidence" that "the foreign interest exercising
control might take action that threatens to impair the national security" and the national
security concerns raised by the transaction are not adequately addressed by other means
under U.S. law.

9

In an average year, CFIUS reviews between sixty and seventy cases, without much public
attention. There have been approximately 1,350 cases reviewed by CFIUS since the law

56. Id.
57. The Exon-Florio Amendment was enacted as part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1425-26 (1988) (amending Title VII of the Defense Production
Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 2158 et seq.)
58. Id.
59. Id.; see also http://www.treas.gov/oii/.

VOL. 35, NO. 2

BUSINESS REGULATION

377

came into effect in 1988. In the overwhelming majority of these reviews, the transactions
were allowed to proceed without government interference as originally structured by the
parties. There were seventy-two CFIUS cases in 2000, but only one in particular received
significant scrutiny and widespread coverage in the news media. This was Nippon Telegraph
and Telephone Corporation's (NTT)proposed acquisition of Colorado-based Internet service and web hosting provider Verio, Inc. for approximately $5.5 billion.
When first announced, this transaction raised concerns for the Department of Justice
and the FBI, which had been utilizing Verio facilities to conduct court-ordered wiretaps,
and did not want to lose that cooperation. 60 A similar issue can arise in any foreign person's
acquisition of a U.S. telecommunications services provider, however, the U.S. government
has statutory authority to require support for wiretapping activity if the target of the acquisition is a telecommunications carrier regulated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The FCC also has the authority to approve communications licensetransfers and can request foreign acquiring companies to "voluntarily" adhere to certain
U.S. policies in order to obtain a license.
In the case of the NTT-Verio transaction, however, there were no FCC-regulated tele61
communications services provided by Verio and, thus, the FCC had no basis to review.
Therefore, the fact of the Exon-Florio review provided the U.S. government with its only
leverage opportunity to negotiate with NTT to encourage NTT to permit Verio to make
an accommodation of FBI wiretapping needs following the acquisition. After NTT agreed
to assist the FBI in the future, CFIUS completed its review of the acquisition in August
2000 and did not recommend any blocking action.62 U.S. government officials involved in
the negotiations reported that because NTT agreed to accept conditions for law enforcement access beyond statutory requirements, the FBI and Department ofJustice concerns
were satisfied.
A similar concern about access for wiretaps following a telecommunications acquisition
by a foreign government-owned carrier arose in the case of Deutsche Telekom's proposed
acquisition of Voicestream, a leading wireless company. 63 In that transaction, the FCC had
to agree to the transfer of licenses and thus had jurisdiction to review the acquisition and
insist on preservation of the FBI's ability to access Voicestream facilities. It appears that the
FBI's concerns were adequately addressed in that transaction in the review process before
the FCC.
In any event, both the NTT and Deutsche Telekom transactions were situations in which
a foreign government had an ownership interest in the foreign company/acquiring
entity. Some members of Congress, most prominently Senator Ernest F Hollings (Democrat-South Carolina), raised objections to these transactions. 64 The Commerce Coin-

60. See Glenn R. Simpson & David S. Cloud, FBI ConcernedAbout N7T-Verio Deal,WSJ Interactive Edition,
July 6, 2000, http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/storieslnews/0,4586,2598979,00.html.
61. See Martin Williams, NTT Reects U.S. Complaints on Verio Buy, IDG NEWS SERViCE, June 5, 2000,
http://www.computerworld.com; Michelle M. Yamada, NTT/Verio Merger Target of U.S. Probe,THE INDUSTRY
STANDARD, July 5, 2000, http://www.computerworld.com.
62. See N7T Communications and Verio Announce Exon-Florio Clearance, http://search.onramp.net/company/
newsroom/2000/in_08_24..00.cfm; see also http://www.verio.com.
63. See Jay Wrolstad, U.S. to Review Deutsche Telekom-Voicestream Merger, WIRELESS NEWSFACTOR, Dec. 20,
2000, at http://wireless.newsfactor.com/perl/story/6210.htnl.
64. See Foreign Telecom Ownership Ban Could Be Cut, http://www.telekomnet.com/news/10-19-00-foreignownershipban.asp, Oct. 19, 2000.
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mittee of the House of Representatives also called a hearing in 2000 to consider the proposed acquisitions by NTT and Deutsche Telekom. Some members of Congress very
strongly object to state-owned communications carriers making telecommunications acquisitions in the United States, because these companies at least theoretically have "deep
pockets" and other unfair advantages doing business in the United States and may also
benefit from restrictions against U.S.-based companies operating in their home markets.
At the end of the last Congress, restrictive legislation directed against foreign-owned
carriers did not become law. However, the attention given to NTT and Deutsche Telekom's
acquisitions suggest that the next time a foreign government-owned telecommunications
company announces an acquisition in the United States, it should anticipate heightened
scrutiny.
IV. Foreign Trusts: New Developments
Treasury Regulations were proposed on August 7, 2000, under reforms of Section 679
of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) enacted in the Small Business Job Protection Act, 6 as
66
amended by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 .
Briefly, the reforms had reinforced prior rules intended to prevent the use of foreign
trusts to evade or avoid tax. Those rules had extended the treatment of a U.S. grantor as
the "owner" of any trust with trust income, deductions, and credits being reportable by the
grantor 67 and, under case law, with other income tax consequences flowing from treating
6
the foreign trust estate as if owned by the grantor. 1
Notice the consequence: a grantor "owner's" gain from a sale by him to his foreign, or
domestic, grantor trust for value is not taxable to him.69
The foreign trust rules apply whether or not the transferor or someone else such as a
beneficiary has any "power or interest" sufficient to make that person the "owner" under
IRC Sections 671 through 678.
Any person making a transfer to a foreign trust can be treated as the "owner" without
7
limitation to the nominal settlor. 0
Such treatment applies generally if there is a U.S. person as a beneficiary during the
particular taxable year of the transferor.7' However, if it does apply, then the transferor's
income for that year includes past-accumulated net income as at the close of the nextpreceding year,72 subject to an interest charge for the deemed delay in distribution.73 Almost

65. Small BusinessJob Protection, Pub. L. 104-188, § 1907(a), 110 Stat. 1755, 1916 (1996).
66. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-34, § 1161, 111 Stat. 788, 987 (1997).
67. I.R.C. § 671 & 679.
68. Rev. Rul. 87-61, 1987-2 C.B. 219 (excise tax under I.R.C. § 1491 held inapplicable to the appreciation
in property transferred to the foreign trust until the grantor surrendered grantor-trust powers-the Service
having refused in Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184, to follow the rationale limiting the tax attributes to those
specified in the statute as propounded in Rothstein v. United States, 735 F.2d 704, 84-1 USTC
9505
(2d Cir. 1984)); Cf.Letter Ruling 199912026 (1998) (grantor trust's gain on sale of his residence heldexcludible
by him as "owner" of the residence under I.R.C. § 121).
69. Cf W. Clarke Swanson v. Comm'r, 518 F.2d 59, 75-2 USTC 9528 (8th Cir. 1975), affirming 33 TCM
296 (1974).
70. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.679-1(c)(1), 65 Fed. Reg. 48,185 (2000); [citations to sections herein being to
those of the Proposed Regulations unless otherwise indicated].
71. I.R.C. § 679(a)(1) (2000).
72. See I.R.C. § 679(b) (2000).
73. See I.R.C. § 668 (2000).
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any U.S. person can be regarded as a U.S. beneficiary, that is, unless no trust income or
principal may be paid to or accumulated for him during the year, including (but not limited
to) what would be distributable if the trust were to be terminated during the year,'4-with
transparency for a nominal beneficiary that is a U.S.-"controlled foreign corporation," a
foreign partnership with a U.S. partner, or a foreign trust or estate having a U.S. beneficiary-and no apparent limitation to the U.S. person's interest.75 No exception appears in
the statute for the case where a person's interest is contingent on a future event "unless the
"6
[Service] is satisfied that the contingency is so remote as to be negligible. A possibility
of distribution to a U.S. person in the event of a termination of the trust, including after
the transferor's death, would be fatal here."
However, a beneficiary is not to be treated as a U.S. person once more than five years
have elapsed between the transfer to the trust and his becoming a U.S. person.', The interim
possibility of becoming a U.S. person is disregarded"9 unless it has become a reality, that
is, unless the beneficiary became a U.S. resident for any period in the interim on the principle that he did not "first" become a resident after five years."0
Specific exemptions were provided by statute for a transfer by reason of the transferor's
death, ending the transferor's status as "owner" of the trust, or a transfer to the trust for
fair market valuel other than an obligation if it is of the trust-or a grantor, "owner", or
2
beneficiary or a person deemed related to any of them or is guaranteed by any of them.
An "obligation" to pay would include an annuity contract, without apparent exception for
an unrelated legal obligation such as one to support a beneficiary who is the transferor's
child. 3
An obligation flowing from the trust or a related person will be disregarded and not be
taken into account in considering whether the transfer is made for value to the trust, except
for "qualified obligations": in writing, with a maximum term of five years, stated in United
States dollars, providing for at least 100 percent, but not more than 130 percent, of the
"applicable Federal rate" at the time of issue. And even then, it is indispensable that the
transferor "extends the period of assessment of any income or transfer tax attributable8 to
4
the transfer and any consequential income tax changes" to three years beyond maturity.
A "guarantee" is defined broadly as "any form of credit support.""5
And there is a special note for the too-aggressive planner: a transfer is not for fair market
value when rent, royalties, interest, compensation and the like are paid except on "arm's
6
length terms.

74.
75.
76.
ercise
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See I.R.C. § 679(c)(2) (2000).
Id.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.679-2(a)(2), 65 Fed. Reg. 48,185 (2000); (disregarding the trustee's possible exof discretion, Example 7).
Seeid.Example 5.
SeeI.R.C. § 679(c)(3) (2000).
See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.679-2(a)(3), 65 Fed. Reg. 48,185 (2000).
Seeid. Example 2.
See I.R.C. §679(a)(2) (2000).
See I.R.C. § 679(a)(3) (2000).
See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.679-1(c)(6), (d), 65 Fed. Reg. 48,185 (2000).
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.679-4(c), (d), 65 Fed. Reg. 48,185 (2000).
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.679-3(c)(4), 65 Fed. Reg. 48,185 (2000).
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.679-4(b)(1)), 65 Fed. Reg. 48,185 (2000).
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A transferor to a trust who is a nonresident alien and who becomes a U.S. resident within
five years, is to be treated as a transferor to the trust as from his residency starting date. 7
This treatment would be extended to income accumulated at that time."8
Similarly, a domestic trust becoming a foreign trust during a U.S. transferor's lifetime
would result in treating the latter's transfer to the trust as if made at that time, with such
treatment being extended to net accumulated income up to that time. 9
Not naming a U.S. person as beneficiary in the trust agreement does not afford absolute
protection. Reference can be made to "written and oral agreements and understandings;
•.. [m]emoranda or letters of wishes; ...

records that relate to the actual distribution of

income and corpus; and ...other documents that relate to the trust, whether or not of any
purported legal effect," or possible amendment or foreign laws benefiting a U.S. person
unless the Service is satisfied that they are "not reasonably expected to be applied or invoked
• . .or if the parties ignore the trust terms or it is reasonably expected that they will do
so."9° Finally, using an "intermediary" is attacked at several points in the Proposed Regulations. 9'
The regime just described above is made inapplicable by IRC Section 679(a)(1) to a trust
described in IRC Section 6048(a)(3)(B)(ii): an employees' deferred-compensation trust or
plan described in Section 402(b), 404(a)(4) or 404A, or an exempt organization, which is
determined by the Treasury, or its delegate to be described in Section 501(c)(3).
Notice that the rules of Section 1.679.1 through 1.679.4 generally will apply to transfers
made after August 7, 2000.92 Exceptionally, Section 1.679-4(c) and (d) will apply to any
obligation issued after February 6, 1995 (or if a "significant modification" is made after
that). Section 1.679-5 applies to persons whose U.S. residency starting date is after August
7, 2000, and Section 1.679-6 applies to trusts becoming foreign after that date.
V. New Investment Incentives in Georgia, North Carolina,
and South Carolina
A.

INTRODUCTION

Many states in the southeastern United States have developed a comprehensive scheme
for encouraging investment. North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia have been
among the leading jurisdictions within the southeastern United States that have developed
such incentives. This section gives a brief summary of legislation passed in 2000 that focuses
on economic development initiatives.
B.

GEORGIA

The Business Expansion and Support Act (BEST) is a new effort to induce job growth
where it is most needed. This new legislation introduced a tier system for the seventy-one
most economically depressed counties by allocating job credits to the least developed coun-

87. See I.R.C. § 679(a)(4) (2000).
88. See id.

89.
90.
91.
92.

See I.R.C. § 679(a)(5) (2000).
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.679-2(a)(4), 65 Fed. Reg. 48,185.
See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.679-3(c), 65 Fed. Reg. 48,185.
See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.679-7, 65 Fed. Reg. 48,185.
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ties. Effective January 1, 2001, the law requires certain health benefits for jobs that qualify
for the tax credit system and sets a wage threshold for jobs to qualify within the system.
Thus, the tier system is divided into four tiers ranking the seventy-one least developed
counties. Tier one provides a $3,500 credit that may be taken against payroll tax or 100
percent of the enterprise corporate income tax liability provided five new jobs are created.
The thirty-five tier two counties set a $2,500 credit per job provided the wages are 5 percent
above the average wage of the county and ten new jobs are created with the investment.
The next thirty-five counties in tier three get a credit of $1,250 for the creation of fifteen
new jobs provided the wages are 10 percent above the average wage of the county. The
eighteen counties in tier four get a $750 credit for the creation of twenty-five new jobs
provided the wage level is 15 percent above the average wage of the county. If a company
currently offers no health benefits to any employees, health benefits will not be a requirement to qualify for the jobs tax credit.
The credit may be maintained for five years from the date of the establishment of the
position, and may be transferred to a subsidiary or to a successor in interest if the company
is sold, merged, acquired, or goes bankrupt. Businesses in tiers three and four may take the
credit against up to 50 percent of their income tax liability and the excess may be carried
forward for ten years. Businesses in tiers one and two can take the credit up to 100 percent
of their income tax liability. A business is defined very broadly with respect to location in
any of the forty least developed counties. The definition is narrower for companies or
enterprises that move into the remaining 119 counties of the state.
Other incentives were updated including tax credits for distressed areas, extension of the
investment tax credit for tier three counties, and extension of the optional tax credit for
tier four counties.
Additionally, the new legislation established a tax credit for companies placing corporate
headquarters in Georgia. To qualify, a business must create a hundred new jobs in the
headquarters' operation and invest at least $1,000,000. The credit provided is $2,500 per
job to be an offset against the company payroll withholding tax for a period of five years.
If the job created pays twice the average of the county where the headquarters is located,
the credit increases to $5,000 per job. The credit may be carried forward for up to ten
years.
C. SoUrH CAROLINA

The South Carolina General Assembly took several significant steps in passing economic
development legislation in its 2000 session. Act No. 289"3 provides for high technology
companies to be afforded the same kinds of tax incentives that have been available to manufacturing, distribution, and processing facilities. The new Act defines "technology-intensive
facilities" as those engaged in the design, development, and introduction of new products
for innovative manufacturing processes through the systematic application of scientific and
technical knowledge. It establishes a research and development income tax credit comparable to the existing federal Georgia and North Carolina income tax credits. The credit
equals 5 percent of the taxpayer's annual increase in qualifying research and development
expenditures. The credit may not offset more than 50 percent of its tax liability after all
other credits have been applied but may be carried forward for ten years. Employee relo93. 2000 S.C. Act 289.
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cation expenses associated with new or expanded technology intensive facilities and the cost
of retraining production and technology employees will qualify under the new credit for
offset. The Act adds an exemption from state sales and use tax for the purchase and use of
machinery used "directly and primarily" in research and development and affords the property tax exemption for research and development facilities by providing a five-year exemption from the non-school portion of county property taxes for facilities engaged primarily
in research and development activities.
Act 28394 provides more flexibility for companies to pay a fee in lieu of tax instead of
paying an ad valorem property tax. The new provision allows unrelated entities to combine
their investments to meet the minimum statutory threshold of $5,000,000 within a county
to obtain the benefits of the reduced assessment. The Act provides more flexibility for the
financing of a fee in lieu of tax transaction with a county by authorizing equipment leases,
build-to-suit leases, synthetic leases, Nordic leases, defeased tax benefit leases and transfer
leases. Thus, a company participating in a transaction need only have a leasehold or other
interest in the project property in order to qualify provided it meets the other requirements.
D.

NORTH CAROLINA

The North Carolina General Assembly passed legislation that modified the Bill Lee Act
and established the Rural Redevelopment Authority and the Rural Internet Access Authority. The modifications to the Bill Lee Act (HB I814/SB 1507) 91 clarified that there will
be no application fee for investment tax credit applications in Development Zones. The
Act changes the period of carry-forward for the application of investment tax credits to
provide a five-year period for $50,000,000 investments and below, a ten-year carry-forward
for investments between $50,000,000 and $150,000,000, and a twenty-year carry-forward
for investments greater than $150,000,000. It establishes a wage test for the Industrial
Recruitment Competitive Fund to encourage the use of these resources to recruit higher
paying jobs and introduced a similar test for non-manufacturing projects with respect to
the qualification for Industrial Development Funds. It set forth new provisions for making
airline maintenance facilities and interstate air carrier hubs eligible for credits and clarified
the type of "buy-out" for employees seeking qualification.
HB1819/SB151696 established the Rural Redevelopment Authority (RRA) as an independent public authority to make loans to local governments and economic development
entities for industrial site development projects. The RRA is responsible for capitalizing
the Rural Internet Access Authority, which is charged with overseeing the extension of
high-speed Internet access to all of rural North Carolina by 2003.

94. 2000 S.C. Act 283.
95. 2000 N.C. Sess. Law H1814.
96. 2000 N.C. Sess. Law H 1819.
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